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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Plaintiff/Petitioner Pearl H. Steffensen has presented the 
following questions for review: 
I. Did the court of appeals erroneously apply a harmless 
error analysis after finding error in the trial court's partial 
directed verdict in favor of Smith's Management Corporation 
("Smith's")? 
A. Is a harmless error analysis appropriate when the 
appellate court finds error in a trial court's directed verdict? 
B. If a harmless error analysis is appropriate in erro-
neous directed verdict cases is that analysis appropriate in this 
case? 
II. Did the court of appeals err in holding that jury in-
struction number 32 was erroneous but harmless? 
III. Did the court of appeals err in affirming the trial 
court's exclusion of evidence? 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The court of appeals opinion, Steffensen v. Smith's Management 
Corp., 172 Utah Adv. Rep 36 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) was issued on 
October 29, 1991 and is enclosed as Appendix A. Mrs. Steffensen's 
petition for rehearing was denied on November 19, 1991; the denial 
was filed on November 20, 1991. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper for this objection in that Petitioner's 
brief was filed on December 18, 1991, and this brief was timely 
filed within thirty (30) days thereafter as required pursuant to 
Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Smith's accepts petitioner's statement of the case. It is 
important to note that Mr. Burnett was peacefully apprehended and 
that his attempt to escape occurred after apprehension while he 
was being taken to the manager's office. Steffensen v. Smith's, 
172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36-37. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO APPLY A 
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS AFTER FINDING THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT HAD ERRED. MRS. STEFFENSEN FAILED TO SHOULDER HER 
BURDEN OF PERSUASION ON APPEAL AND CANNOT MERELY PETITION 
THIS COURT FOR A SECOND CHANCE TO MEET THAT BURDEN. 
There is no value in remanding a case to the trial court on 
the basis of error if there is no likelihood, based upon the evi-
dence, that the verdict of the jury would be other than what it 
was. The court of appeals recognized this basic premise when it 
applied a harmless error analysis after finding that the trial 
court had erred in granting a partial directed verdict in favor of 
Smith's. 
A. IT IS INSUFFICIENT TO PERSUADE THE APPEAL COURT THAT AN ERROR 
HAS OCCURRED WITHOUT ALSO PROVING A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD THAT 
THE OUTCOME WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE FAVORABLE TO MRS. STEFFENSEN. 
This Court has consistently held that where an error is found 
on appeal, reversal is only appropriate where there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome to the appellant. Matter 
of Estate of Kesler, 702 P.2d 86 (Utah 1985); Cerritos Trucking 
Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1. 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 1982); Lee v. Mitch-
ell Funeral Home Ambulance Service, 606 P.2d 259 (Utah 1980). 
We may reverse a trial court judgment only 
if there is a reasonable likelihood that, 
absent the error, there would have been a 
2 
result more favorable to the complaining par-
ty. 
Kesler at 96 (emphasis added). The finding of error is insuffi-
cient to reverse a case. The appellate court must also find that 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the complaining party would 
have prevailed. Lee v. Mitchell at 261. 
Mrs. Steffensen is mistaken when she claims that a harmless 
error analysis is never applied in cases of directed verdicts. 
This Court has held that where a directed verdict was erroneous, 
the error must be prejudicial and is reversible only where reason-
able likelihood of a different outcome has been demonstrated by 
the appellant. 
Although in passing on a motion for directed 
verdict it is not proper for the trial court 
to weigh evidence. . . that he did so in this 
case did not result in prejudicial error since 
the defendants were not entitled to succeed in 
any event. . . This Court will not reverse a 
trial court judgment merely because there may 
have been error; reversal occurs only if the 
error is such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, in its absence, there would 
have been a result more favorable to the 
complaining party. 
Cerritos v. Utah Venture at 613 (emphasis added). 
A careful reading of the directed verdict cases listed by Mrs. 
Steffensen indicates that, after finding error in a directed 
verdict, the appellate courts reviewed the evidence to determine 
whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the complaining 
party would prevail. In those cases, the courts did find suffi-
cient evidence of prejudice to support reversal. However, they 
could also have found insufficient likelihood of a different out-
come. This is the harmless error analysis Mrs. Steffensen com-
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plains of and which the appellate courts routinely, though not 
always explicitly, conducts. 
It is appropriate for the appeals court to apply a harmless 
error analysis in cases where it finds error on the part of the 
trial court. This is true even if the error involves a directed 
verdict. 
B. MRS, STEFFENSEN HAD THE BURDEN TO PERSUADE THE COURT OF AP-
PEALS THAT THE ERRONEOUS DIRECTED VERDICT WAS PREJUDICIAL IN 
THAT SHE HAD A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF PREVAILING IF THE 
ERROR HAD NOT BEEN MADE. 
On appeal, the appellant has the burden of showing not only 
the existence of the error, but that the error was prejudicial in 
that there was a likelihood of prevailing had the error not been 
made. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 
47, 51 (Utah 1974). It is insufficient to claim a possibility of 
a different outcome. The "likelihood" standard set forth in the 
cases discussed in Point I. A. above is a much higher standard. 
The trial court reviewed the evidence presented on appeal in 
determining whether there was a reasonable likelihood of a differ-
ent outcome in favor of Mrs. Steffensen. It found no such likeli-
hood. 
[T]he jury must have concluded that either: 
(1) the post-apprehension negligence was too 
attenuated and remote from the injury to con-
stitute the proximate cause, or (2) Mr. Bur-
nett's attempt to flee was an unforeseeable 
superseding proximate cause of the injury. We 
cannot see how the jury would have reached a 
different conclusion had it been allowed to 
consider acts Smith performed, or failed to 
perform, prior to apprehending Mr. Burnett. 
Accordingly we find it highly unlikely the jury 
would have changed its proximate cause decision 
had the trial judge submitted to them the issue 
of Smith's failure to deter Mr. Burnett's 
shoplifting. Therefore, we find the trial 
court's partial directed verdict on the issue 
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of proximate causation to be, at most, harmless 
error. 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corporation. 172 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 39 (emphasis added). Where an appellate court determines on 
review that there is no reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcome, it is appropriate to find that error to be 
harmless. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
It is clear that the court of appeals conducted the proper 
inquiry into the likelihood of a different outcome. Mrs. Steffen-
sen had merely failed to persuade the court on that issue. It is 
inappropriate for this Court to substitute its judgment for that 
of the court of appeals in granting a writ of certiorari. The writ 
is appropriate only if the court of appeals exceeds or abuses its 
discretionary functions, not if a party merely disapproves of the 
court's holdings. 
Because harmless error analysis is appropriate in cases of 
erroneous directed verdicts and because petitioner did not carry 
her burden of persuading the court of appeals that she was preju-
diced by the error, there is no basis for this Court to review 
these issues. The Court should, therefore, deny the writ as to 
point I raised by Mrs. Steffensen. 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT'S MISSTATEMENT OF THE LAW RES-
PECTING FORESEEABILITY IS IN ERROR, MRS. STEFFENSEN HAS 
STILL FAILED TO SHOW THAT THE OUTCOME, EITHER AT THE 
TRIAL OR APPELLATE LEVEL, WAS LIKELY TO BE IN HER FAVOR 
BUT FOR THE ERROR. 
Mrs. Steffensen disputes the court of appeals' statement 
regarding foreseeability as discussed and the law dealing with that 
concept. However, she has failed to do more than raise the impli-
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cation that the erroneous jury instruction precluded the possibil-
ity of her prevailing at trial. 
As discussed in Point I, Mrs. Steffensen had the burden (as 
well as the opportunity) to persuade the court of appeals that but 
for the erroneous jury instruction she would likely have prevailed 
in the trial court. The court of appeals, in its discussion of 
the post-apprehension evidence and the jury's verdict, indicates 
the possibility that the jury could have found negligence and 
causation but chose not to do so. A correct jury instruction on 
foreseeability would not likely have affected the jury's conclu-
sions as stated by the court of appeals: 
[T]he jury must have concluded that either: 
(1) the post-apprehension negligence was too 
attenuated and remote from the injury to con-
stitute the proximate cause, or (2) Mr. Bur-
nett's attempt to flee was an unforeseeable 
superseding proximate cause of the injury. 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corporation, 172 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 36. Had the jury been given Instruction No. 32 in the form 
submitted by Mrs. Steffensen, there is little likelihood that it 
would have changed its proximate cause decision. This is exactly 
the holding of the court of appeals. 
Mrs. Steffensen argues that the court of appeals has overruled 
previous Utah law on the issue of foreseeability. This is not 
true. The court of appeals stated that "The question of fore-
seeability goes to the issue of negligence. . •" 172 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 40. This is a true, though perhaps incomplete, statement 
of the law. The court did not state that foreseeability is not an 
issue in proximate cause. It did not, therefore, overrule exist-
ing case law on the subject. 
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Mrs. Steffensen failed to meet her burden of proof on appeal 
and wishes now, before this Court, to re-argue the issue still 
without giving any proof of the likelihood of a different outcome. 
It is not the purpose of a writ of certiorari to give a disgruntled 
party a second chance to conduct its appeal. See Rule 46 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
POINT III 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT MISINTERPRET RULE 704, UTAH 
RULES OF EVIDENCE, IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT PROP-
ERLY EXCLUDED EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY. 
A. THE EXCLUSION OF TESTIMONY ON THE EMPLOYEE TRAINING PROGRAM 
WAS MADE ON THE BASIS OF RELEVANCE AND IS NOT INCONSISTENT 
WITH RULE 704. 
In its brief before the court of appeals, Smith's argued that 
the trial court has the discretion to decide whether or not evi-
dence submitted is relevant, probative or confusing, based upon 
Rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, even if presented by an 
expert witness. It is the function of the trial court to balance 
the questions of probative value against prejudicial or confusing 
effects. (Appellee's Brief, pages 10-11). The trial court ex-
cluded the expert's testimony about the training program only after 
weighing its relevance and considering its possibility of confusing 
the issues for the jury. (T. 339-340). 
Reviewing this material, the court of appeals, without ex-
pressly finding error in the exclusion of evidence, determined that 
an error in excluding the evidence would be harmless because the 
jury found Smith's, negligent. Smith's Management Corporation. 172 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 40. The most that could have been accomplished 
by admitting that testimony would have been to lead the jury to 
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conclude that Smith's was negligent before and after the apprehen-
sion. This is not a significant distinction and clearly does not 
give Mrs. Steffensen more than would the verdict of negligence as 
entered by the jury. 
Mrs. Steffensen had the burden on appeal of demonstrating that 
the excluded evidence could have influenced the jury to render a 
different verdict on the issue of negligence and that different 
verdict would have resulted in a different overall outcome. Anton 
v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah App. 1991). The outcome on the 
issue of negligence would not have been different and Mrs. Stef-
fensen was not prejudiced by the court's choice to exclude the 
evidence. As in other areas on appeal, Mrs. Steffensen simply 
failed to meet her burden of proof on the issue of prejudice. 
B. THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE ON APPORTIONMENT IS APPROPRIATE AND 
NOT PREJUDICIAL. 
The issue of apportionment of fault is a matter for the jury. 
Little America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 
1982); Lamkin v. Lvnch, 600 P.2d 530, 531 (Utah 1979). There is 
no question that an expert may testify regarding apportionment if 
the expert supplies evidence which would assist the jury in making 
its determination apportioning fault. This is the type of testi-
mony contemplated by Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence. However, 
though an expert may testify as to the ultimate issues, he or she 
may not give testimony amounting to a legal conclusion which, in 
effect, tells the jury what to decide rather than assisting the 
jury in evaluation of facts. The court of appeals recognized this 
distinction in finding that apportionment of fault is an impermis-
sible legal conclusion. Steffensen v. Smith's Management 
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Corporation, 172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40. Citing Davidson v. Prince, 
813 P.2d 1225 (Utah App. 1991) the court noted that a trial court 
may properly exclude expert witness testimony which reached a legal 
conclusion. 
Had the apportionment testimony been admitted, the effective 
outcome of the case would not be different. This is true even if 
the jury had found proximate cause and imposed liability on 
Smith's. The liability of joint tort-feasers is joint and several; 
therefore, testimony of apportionment of fault is irrelevant as to 
the liability of a single defendant as to the plaintiff. Yost v. 
State, 640 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Utah 1981). Apportionment establishes 
only rights and obligations which the joint tort-feasers have 
toward each other. As to the plaintiff, each defendant would be 
liable for the full amount of damages awarded by the jury. 
Regardless of the application of Rule 704 or the other rules of 
evidence, the exclusion of testimony regarding apportionment did 
not prejudice Mrs. Steffensen. 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals properly applied a harmless error 
analysis to the various errors claimed by Mrs. Steffensen on 
appeal. Mrs. Steffensen failed to meet the burden of proof 
required by her to obtain a reversal on the basis of error by 
failing to demonstrate prejudice through a showing that it was 
likely she would have prevailed had the errors not been committed. 
Having failed to meet that burden of proof and not being happy with 
the outcome on appeal, she now wishes to have a second chance. 
This is not sufficient justification for issuance of a writ of 
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certiorari. This Court should, therefore, deny Mrs. Steffensen's 
opinion. 
Respectfully submitted the day pf January, 1992. 
Christopher A. Tolboe 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on the day of January, 1992, I 
caused four (4) true and correct copies of the above Objection to 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to be mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Richard B. McKeown 
PARKER, McKEOWN & McCONKIE 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Curtis C. Nesset 
1312 Colonial Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT/ &il'08 , ^ // ^ 7 7 i^i>^ 
iristopher A. Tolboe 
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APPENDIX A 
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36 O l l l l l l l 172 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before 
him ... there is a fair probability that contra-
band or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 
S. Ct. at 2332. Here, Buford's prior drug 
related history, the circumstances of Rodri-
guez^ unwitting buy, and the presence of 
drugs and drug paraphernalia in plain view of 
police officers following forced entry under 
exigent circumstances, all set forth in the aff-
idavit, provided the magistrate with the requ-
ired "'substantial basis for ... concluding]' 
that probable cause existed." Id. 462 U.S. at 
238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332 (quoting Jones v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S. Ct. 
725,736(1960)). 
In conclusion, we find that based on the 
totality of the circumstances presented in the 
affidavit, the magistrate had a substantial 
basis for finding that probable cause existed 
for issuance of the warrant. We therefore 
affirm Buford's conviction. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. See, e.g., State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465 
(Utah 1990); State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 147-48 
OJtah App. 1991), cert, denied, _Utah Adv. Rep 
(Utah 1991). 
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a 
negligence action. Plaintiff Pearl Steffensen 
was injured in defendant Smith's Management 
Corporation's ("Smith") grocery store by a 
shoplifter attempting to flee from the store's 
management. The jury found Smith was neg-
ligent, but the negligence was not the proxi-
mate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. On 
appeal, Mrs. Steffensen asserts the trial court 
improperly: (1) ruled Smith's failure to train 
its employees as to the appropriate methods to 
deal with shoplifters or to deter shoplifting 
was not, as a matter of law, the proximate 
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury; (2) charged 
the jury on the law of foreseeability; and (3) 
excluded certain expert testimony. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On March 2, 1987, Bradley Burnett entered 
a Smith's grocery store to shoplift beer and 
cigarettes. Gary Canham, the store's front-
end manager, observed Mr. Burnett take beer 
and cigarettes from the store's shelves. As Mr. 
Burnett walked toward the front of the store, 
Mr. Canham suspected Mr. Burnett might 
attempt to leave the store without paying for 
the merchandise. Mr. Canham immediately 
informed Paul Rompus, Smith's Drug King 
manager, and together the two watched Mr. 
Burnett from the office area at the front of 
the store. As Mr. Burnett walked toward the 
front of the store, he noticed the two mana-
gers and felt they were watching him. Accor-
dingly, Mr. Burnett got in line at a check-out 
stand. As soon as Mr. Burnett felt he was no 
longer being watched, he got out of line and 
walked quickly toward the door with the 
merchandise. 
The two managers then confronted Mr. 
Burnett and asked him to come with them to 
their office. As the three walked toward the 
office, Mr. Rompus called out to another 
employee at the front of the store, telling her 
to call the police. As the group reached the 
office area, Mr. Burnett turned and "broke" 
toward the exit, dropping the beer and cigar-
ettes as he ran. Mr. Rompus yelled "stop him-
-see if you can stop him," in an effort to 
engage the assistance of others. Responding to 
the call for help, another employee attempted 
to stop Mr. Burnett by assuming a football 
blocking stance in the aisle. Mr. Burnett 
dodged this employee, turning in a different 
direction, and as he did so, ran directly into 
another employee. Mr. Burnett "bounced" off 
this employee directly into the plaintiff, Mrs. 
Steffensen, who was standing at the customer 
service counter writing a check. The force of 
the collision knocked Mrs. Steffensen to the 
ground, where she struck her head on the tile 
floor. Mrs. Steffensen was taken to the hos-
pital and has since suffered severe "stroke-
like" paralysis 
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like" paralysis to the entire left side of her 
body. 
Subsequently, Mrs. Steffensen commenced 
this action against Smith, claiming Smith was 
negligent in dealing with Mr. Burnett and that 
this negligence caused her injury. At the con-
clusion of the presentation of evidence, 
defense counsel moved for a partial directed 
verdict on the grounds that Smith's failure to 
deter Mr. Burnett from shoplifting could not, 
as a matter of law, be a proximate cause of 
Mrs. Steffensen's injuries. The trial judge 
granted the motion and incorporated this 
ruling in his instructions to the jury. At the 
conclusion of trial, the judge submitted 
written interrogatories to the jury. After deli-
beration, the jury found Smith had acted 
negligently, but Smith's negligence did not 
proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's injury. 
I. PROXIMATE CAUSE 
Mrs. Steffensen's first claim of error is the 
trial court improperly granted Smith a partial 
directed verdict on the element of proximate 
causation. During the trial, Mrs. Steffensen 
proceeded on two theories of negligence. First, 
Mrs. Steffensen asserted Smith had been 
negligent in failing to train its employees to 
use techniques to "deter" Mr. Burnett from 
shoplifting and, alternatively, that Smith's 
employees negligently failed to utilize these 
techniques in dealing with Mr. Burnett. 
Second, Mrs. Steffensen claimed Smith was 
negligent in chasing and attempting to stop 
Mr. Burnett after he broke away and ran. 
Mrs. Steffensen argued that both of these acts 
of negligence endangered the safety of Smith's 
customers and ultimately caused her injuries. 
At the close of evidence, Smith asked the 
trial judge for a partial directed verdict, ruling 
that as a matter of law, even if its employees 
had been inadequately trained about the need 
for deterrence and failed to utilize deterrence, 
such failure was not the proximate cause of 
Mrs. Steffensen's injury. The trial court 
granted Smith's request and instructed the 
jury that all Smith's conduct prior to the stop 
and detention of Mr. Burnett should not be 
considered by the jury:1 
You have heard testimony regarding 
events that occurred prior to the 
time of the stop of the shoplifter, 
Mr. Burnett. 
You are instructed that none of the 
actions of the Smith's employees 
prior to the stop and detention 
proximately caused plaintiff's inj-
uries. Therefore, you must not take 
this testimony into consideration 
when deliberating and making your 
decision. 
A directed verdict is only appropriate when 
the court is able to conclude that reasonable 
minds would not differ on the facts to be 
determined from the evidence presented. 
Management Comm. v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 
652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). A directed 
verdict cannot stand when, reviewing the evi-
dence in a light most favorable to the losing 
party, "there is a reasonable basis in the evi-
dence and in the inferences to be drawn ther-
efrom that would support a judgment in [the 
losing party's] favor." Id. at 898; see Penrod 
v. Carter, 737 P.2d 199, 200 (Utah 1987). 
Mrs. Steffensen claims the trial judge's jury 
instruction concerning pre-apprehension 
evidence was improper because reasonable 
minds could differ as to whether a failure to 
"deter" Mr. Burnett from shoplifting was the 
proximate cause of her injuries. 
In Utah, a negligence claim requires the 
plaintiff to establish four elements: that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; that 
defendant breached the duty (negligence); that 
the breach of the duty was the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injury; and that there was 
in fact injury. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 
111, 116 (Utah 1991). Proximate cause is "that 
cause which, in natural and continuous sequ-
ence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening 
cause), produces the injury and without which 
the result would not have occurred. It is the 
efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets 
in operation the factors that accomplish the 
injury." State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 482 & 
n.2 (Utah 1984). Further, there can be more 
than one proximate cause of an injury so long 
as each is a concurrent contributing factor in 
causing the injury. See Anderson v. Parson 
Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 
467 P.2d 45, 46 (1970); Jaques v. Farrimond, 
14 Utah 2d 166, 380 P.2d 133, 134 (1963). 
It is well established that the question of 
proximate cause is generally reserved for the 
jury. Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 
541, 544 (Utah 1984); Ostler v. Albina Tran-
sfer Co, Inc., 781 P.2d 445, 451 (Utah App. 
1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 
1990). Only in rare cases may a trial judge rule 
as a matter of law on the issue of proximate 
causation. 
This principle is illustrated by several Utah 
Supreme Court decisions. In Harris v. Utah 
Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983), 
the passenger of a jeep brought an action 
against a bus company and the jeep driver for 
injuries sustained in a traffic accident. The 
trial court granted the bus company a directed 
verdict, instructing the jury that if they found 
the jeep driver should have observed the bus 
prior to the accident, they must find, as a 
matter of law, that the jeep driver was the sole 
proximate cause of the accident. On appeal, 
the plaintiff claimed that a jury could infer 
that the bus negligently contributed to the 
accident and pointed to allegations that the 
bus stopped too rapidly, failed to drive out of 
the lane of traffic, and had faulty brake lights. 
Id. at 220. The Utah Supreme Court agreed 
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with the plaintiff and reversed the directed 
verdict The Hams court held it improper for 
the trial judge to have taken the issue of pro-
ximate cause from the jury The court expla 
ined "Where the evidence is in dispute inclu 
ding the inferences from the evidence, the 
issue should be submitted to the jury " Id 
Likewise, in Jensen v Mountain States 
Telephone & Telegraph Co, 611 P 2d 363 
(Utah 1980), the trial judge granted defendant 
summary judgment on the issue of proximate 
cause in an action where the plaintiff had been 
injured in an automobile accident The plain 
tiff claimed he was unable to see approaching 
traffic in executing a left-hand turn because 
a van owned by the defendant utility company 
negligently blocked his view by remaining in 
the intersection, and this was an intervening 
proximate cause of the accident On appeal, 
the Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
summary judgment on the issue of proximate 
cause The court held that the issue of proxi 
mate cause may only be taken from the jury 
where reasonable minds could not differ as to 
what "was or was not the proximate cause of 
the injury " Id at 365 n 4 The court concl-
uded that "ma situation involving indepen-
dent intervening cause, the primary issue is 
one of the foreseeabihty of the subsequent 
negligent conduct of a third person, and in 
this case, [the issue of proximate cause] must 
be resolved by the finder of fact Id at 365 
(emphasis added) 
In Mitchell v Pearson Enterprises, 697 P 2d 
240 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court's summary judgment for 
defendant on the issue of proximate causation 
because the court found no evidence of prox 
imate cause and determined that, without 
evidence, the issue would have been left to 
juror speculation In Mitchell, dependents of a 
murdered hotel guest brought a wrongful 
death action against the hotel after the dece 
ased had been unexplainedly murdered in his 
hotel room Plaintiffs sought to prove that the 
hotel management was negligent in its security 
measures and that such negligence proximately 
caused the murder On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld the trial judge's 
summary judgment for the defendant The 
court held that because there was no evidence 
as to how the murderer entered the deceased's 
room, plaintiffs had failed to show a factual 
connection between the negligent security 
measures and the murder The Mitchell court 
recognized that the murderer could have 
entered the room in a number of ways, many 
of which would have had no connection with 
the hotel's security measures, including by 
invitation of the deceased Because plaintiffs 
bore the burden to show defendant's cpnduct 
was a "substantial causative factor that led to 
the [guest's] death," id at 246, and because 
plaintiffs had offered no evidence other than 
mere speculation as to how the murderer got 
Provo Utah i 
in the room, summary judgment on the issue 
of proximate causation was proper 
In sum, the issue of proximate cause should 
be taken from the jury only where (1) there is 
no evidence to establish a causal connection, 
thus leaving causation to jury speculation, or 
(2) where reasonable persons could not differ 
on the inferences to be derived from the evi 
dence on proximate causation Robertson v 
Sixpence Inns of America, Inc , 163 Ariz 539, 
789 P 2d 1040, 1047 (1990)(en banc) 
Smith argues that its failure to deter Mr 
Burnett could not have been the proximate 
cause of Mrs Steffensen's injury because 
there was not an unbroken causal line between 
this failure and Mrs Steffensen's injury 
Specifically, Smith argues the act of apprehe-
nding Mr Burnett, Mr Burnett's decision to 
run, and Mr Burnett's physical encounter 
with Smith's employees, were, as a matter of 
law, intervening proximate causes and there 
fore broke the chain of causation flowing 
from its failure to deter 
Smith correctly asserts that "a more recent 
negligent act may break the chain of causation 
and relieve the liability of a prior negligent 
actor under the proper circumstances " 
Godesky, 690 P 2d at 544 However, if the 
subsequent negligent act is foreseeable to the 
prior actor, both acts are concurring causes 
and the prior actor is not absolved of liability 
Id The issue is whether the subsequent inter 
vening conduct, either criminal or negligent, 
was reasonably foreseeable Id at 545, Harris, 
671 P 2d at 220 "A superseding cause, suffi 
cient to become the proximate cause of the 
final result and relieve defendant of liability 
for his original negligence, arises only when an 
intervening force was unforeseeable and may 
be described with the benefit of hindsight, as 
extraordinary " Robertson, 789 P 2d at 1047 2 
The fact that the final act which produces the 
injury is the criminal conduct of a third party 
does not preclude the finding that an earlier 
negligent act was the proximate cause of 
injury if the criminal conduct was, under the 
circumstances, reasonably foreseeable Robe-
rtson, 789 P 2d at 1047, Mitchell, 697 P 2d at 
246 
First, Smith cannot rely on its own subseq 
uent acts of negligence to break the chain of 
causation between an earlier act ot negligence 
and the injury Only the unforeseeable acts of 
another constitute an intervening proximate 
cause See State v Marty, 166 Ariz 233, 801 
P 2d 468, 472 (Ct App 1990), People v 
Gentry, 738 P 2d 1188, 1190 (Colo 1987), State 
v Neher, 52 Wash App 298, 759 P 2d 
475, 476 (1988), afVd, 112 Wash 2d 347, 771 
P 2d 330 (1989) To hold otherwise would 
allow tortfeasors to escape liability by com-
mitting additional acts of negligence following 
an initial breach of a duty Therefore, Smith's 
apprehension of Mr Burnett and the subseq-
uent chase through the store did not break the 
chain of causa 
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chain of causation. 
Likewise, we are hesitant to say, as a matter 
of law, that Mr. Burnett's acts following 
apprehension broke the chain of causation 
between Smith's failure to deter Mr. Burnett 
and Mrs. Steffensen's injury. Substantial 
evidence before the jury indicated that Smith 
could have reasonably foreseen a customer 
would be injured by a shoplifter's decision to 
run, particularly when, instead of deterring the 
shoplifter, Smith chose to "play cat and 
mouse" with him. Certainly Mrs. Steffensen 
presented evidence on this theorv of causation. 
A closer question is whether any reasonable 
juror could conclude that the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn from it show 
Smith's failure to deter was a contributing 
cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. 
In this case, Mrs. Steffensen introduced 
substantial expert testimony that, in dealing 
with shoplifters, deterrence measures prevent 
shoplifting and thus promote customer safety. 
During trial, Mr;>. Steffensen presented testi-
mony from security and shoplifting experts 
who testified that Smith's employees failed to 
use reasonable means to handle Mr. Burnett, a 
suspected shoplifter, sufficient to protect the 
safety of the store's customers. These experts 
identified two specific and generally accepted 
techniques that retail stores employ when 
dealing with shoplifters and which Smith 
failed to implement. First, the experts testified 
that a retail store should take steps to "deter" 
a suspected shoplifter from carrying out his or 
her plan by taking such affirmati\e action as 
making direct eye contact with the suspected 
shoplifter, approaching the suspected shopli-
fter and offering assistance, and calling for 
security over the public intercom system. 
Second, the experts testified that a retail store 
should also train its employees to use care 
when apprehending a shoplifter. The experts 
agreed that employees should not chase or use 
force with a shoplifter who becomes violent or 
flees. These experts testified that stores 
employ, or should employ, such techniques 
primarily to protect the safety of their custo-
mers and to prevent incidents precisely like the 
one which occurred in this case.3 In addition, 
Mrs. Steffensen submitted copies of Smith's 
employee training manuals which advocated 
deterrence when dealing with shoplifters.4 Mr. 
Burnett was, in fact, deterred when he thought 
Smith's employees were watching while he was 
in the store. He went to get in the check out 
line and waited there until he believed he was 
not being watched. Further, Mrs. Steffensen's 
experts testified that approximately five 
percent of all shoplifters, when apprehended, 
run. They likewise testified that the proper use 
of deterrence techniques can reducer this 
number by reducing the number of shoplifters 
as a whole. 
Thus, we are hesitant to uphold the trial 
court's ruling that, as a matter of law, 
Smith's failure to deter Mr Burnett was not a 
contributing proximate cause of Mrs. Steffe-
nsen's injury. There was probably sufficient 
evidence produced from which a reasonable 
juror could infer that Smith's failure to deter 
was a negligent act,5 as it would have been 
reasonably foreseeable to an adequately 
trained employee that his or her decision to 
apprehend the shoplifter in a crowded store 
could have led to a customer's injury. 
However, this does not end our inquiry. If 
the trial court's partial directed verdict was 
harmless error, we need not reverse. See Utah 
R. Civ. P. 61 (1991); Stare v. Verde, 770 P.2d 
116, 120 (Utah 1989). On appeal, the appellant 
has the burden of demonstrating an error was 
prejudicial-that there is a "reasonable lik-
elihood that the error affected the outcome of 
the proceedings." Verde, 770 P.2d at 120. 
Further, in determining whether a trial court's 
error was harmful, we must look beyond the 
mere fact of error and consider in totality all 
the evidence and proceedings below. See, e.g., 
Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah 
1983) (erroneous jury instruction not reversible 
error when considered in light ot all instruct-
ions and evidence). Although normally we 
would be reluctant to uphold an erroneous 
directed verdict on harmless error grounds, in 
this case we cannot ignore the fact that the 
jury's verdict would not have differed had the 
trial judge not granted Smith's partial directed 
verdict. 
At trial, Mrs. Steitensen presented substa-
ntial evidence of Smith's negligence: the 
store's failure to deter Mr. Burnett's shopli-
fting, the negligent apprehension and holding 
of Mr. Burnett, and the improper pursuit of 
Mr. Burnett once he ran for the door. The 
trial court's partial directed verdict removed 
from the jury's consideration only the portion 
of this evidence relating to Smith's actions 
before Mr. Burnett's apprehension. In retur-
ning a verdict for the defendant on the rema-
ining evidence, the jury found that although 
Smith had acted negligently, the negligence did 
not proximately cause Mrs. Steffensen's inj-
uries. Therefore, the jury must have concluded 
that either: (1) the post-apprehension negli-
gence was too attenuated and remote from the 
injury to constitute the proximate cause, or (2) 
Mr. Burnett's attempt to flee was an unfore-
seeable superseding proximate cause of the 
injury. We cannot see how the jury would 
have reached a different conclusion had it 
been allowed to consider acts Smith perfo-
rmed, or failed to perform, prior to apprehe-
nding Mr. Burnett. Accordingly, we find it 
highly unlikely the jury would have changed 
its proximate cause decision had the trial judge 
submitted to them the issue of Smith's failure 
to deter Mr. Burnett's shoplifting. Therefore, 
we find the trial court's partial directed 
verdict on the issue of proximate causation to 
be, at most, harmless error. 
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II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Next, Mrs. Steffensen claims the trial court 
incorrectly stated the law with regard to for-
eseeability when it instructed the jury concer-
ning her second theory of negligence-the 
post-apprehension chase. We review challe-
nges to jury instructions under a "correctness" 
standard. See Knapstad v. Smith's Manage-
ment Corp., 774 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah App. 1989). 
The trial court's jury instruction number 
thirty-two charged the jury that: 
Foreseeability in these instructions 
means injury or harm, if any, to a 
customer which the defendant and 
its employees could have reasonably 
anticipated as the natural consequ-
ences of their actions, if any, even 
though they were not able to anti-
cipate the particular injury which 
did occur. In determining what is 
foreseeable, you must determine that 
the actions by Burnett were 
predictable by Smith's employees 
and not just a mere possibility. 
Mrs. Steffensen claims this instruction impr-
operly focused on the particular acts of Mr. 
Burnett, rather than focusing on shoplifters in 
general. We agree that the specific identity of 
the shoplifter is irrelevant to the question of 
foreseeability. See Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183 
(foreseeability that criminal act will occur 
establishes duty). However, it is unnecessary 
for us to reach the merits of Mrs. Steffensen's 
claim because any error committed by the trial 
judge was harmless. See Utah R. Civ. P. 61 
(1991); Verde, 770 P.2d at 120 (Utah 1989). 
The question of foreseeability goes to the issue 
of negligence, and the jury found Smith neg-
ligent. Therefore, any error in defining fores-
eeability did not affect the jury's verdict. 
III. EXCLUSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Mrs. Steffensen's next claim of error is the 
trial judge improperly excluded portions of her 
expert testimony. First, the trial court forbade 
one of Mrs. Steffensen's experts from testif-
ying about Smith's employee training practices 
as they related to the way its employees handle 
shoplifters. Second, the trial court did not 
allow Mrs. Steffensen's expert to give an 
opinion as to the relative proportion of fault 
between Smith and Mr. Burnett. Challenges to 
evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of 
expert testimony, are reviewed under a defer-
ential "clear error" standard. See Davidson v. 
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Utah App. 
1991); State v. Kinsey, 797 P.2d 424, 427 
(Utah App. 1990). Further, an appellant bears 
the burden of demonstrating that the excluded 
evidence could have influenced the jury to 
render a different verdict. Anton v. Thomas, 
806 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah App. 1991). 
A. Testimony On Employee Training 
Mrs. Steffensen contends the trial court 
should have admitted expert testimony conc-
erning Smith's failure to adequately train its 
employees regarding the proper handling of 
shoplifters, including techniques for deterring 
shoplifting. At trial, the judge did not permit 
Smith to introduce this expert testimony on 
the grounds that Smith's failure to deter Mr. 
Burnett could not have been the proximate 
cause of the injury, and therefore the testi-
mony was irrelevant. 
Our resolution of the proximate cause issue 
relating to shoplifter "deterrence" mandates a 
finding that if this ruling was error, the error 
was harmless. Furthermore, the exclusion of 
any training evidence relating to Smith's 
employees chasing Mr. Burnett was also har-
mless as the jury found Smith negligent in its 
apprehension and chasing of Mr. Burnett. 
B. Testimony Apportioning Fault 
Mrs. Steffensen's final argument is that her 
expert witness should have been allowed to 
render an opinion concerning the relative fault 
of Smith and Mr. Burnett. Smith contends the 
trial court's ruling was correct because the 
apportionment of fault requires the expert to 
render a legal conclusion and is thus inadmi-
ssible under Utah law. We agree with Smith 
that the apportionment of fault requires a 
legal opinion and, therefore, such a determi-
nation should be reserved for the jury. 
This court recently considered the question 
of what expert opinions are permissible as 
going to the "ultimate issue,"6 and what expert 
opinions are inadmissible as "legal" conclus-
ions. See Davidson, 813 P.2d at 1230-32. In 
Davidson, we held the trial court properly 
excluded an expert opinion which concluded 
that the defendant was negligent. In doing so, 
we stated that "[questions which allow a 
witness to simply tell a jury what result to 
reach are not permitted." Id. at 1231. A 
witness may testify as to the defendant's 
actions, including whether the defendant acted 
with care; however, the witness may not con-
sider all the facts and render a final legal 
conclusion. We find apportionment of fault 
between parties to be exactly this type of 
impermissible legal conclusion. It is for the 
jury to place a legal proportion on the relative 
faults of the parties. Therefore, we hold that 
the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony 
regarding the relative proportion of fault 
between Smith and Mr. Burnett was correct. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, even if the trial judge impro-
perly invaded the province of the jury by 
granting Smith a partial directed verdict on the 
issue of proximate causation, such error was 
harmless given the jury's finding that Smith's 
subsequent negligent acts were not the proxi-
mate cause of Mrs. Steffensen's injury. 
Further, any error in defining "foreseeability" 
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for the jury was rendered harmless by the 
jury's finding that Smith was negligent. 
Finally, the trial court correctly excluded 
expert testimony which would have improperly 
rendered a legal conclusion as to the propor-
tion of fault between Smith and Mr. Burnett. 
Accordingly, we affirm the jury verdict for 
defendant. 
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding 
Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
1. Although the trial judge both granted a directed 
verdict and incorporated his ruling in the court's 
jury instructions, we conclude the ruling is most 
accurately characterized as a partial directed verdict. 
A directed verdict makes a determination as to an 
element of a cause of action, and takes such deter-
mination from the purview of the jury-as was 
done here. The Utah Supreme Court characterized 
the same action of a trial judge as a directed verdict 
in Harris v. Utah Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217, 219 
(Utah 1983). In Harris, a personal injury action 
stemming from a jeep-bus collision, the trial judge 
instructed the jury that if they found that the defe-
ndant jeep driver should have observed the bus, 
then they must conclude, as a matter of law, the 
jeep driver was the sole proximate cause of the col-
lision, thereby precluding liability stemming from 
the bus driver's actions, Id. On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that this instruction was 
in fact a directed verdict and treated it as such. The 
trial judge's ruling in this case is indistinguishable 
from the ruling in Harris, and therefore we likewise 
consider the trial court's ruling a directed verdict 
and review it accordingly. See also Cerritos Truc-
king Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608 
(Utah 1982Xmotion for directed verdict tests the 
sufficiency of the evidence). 
2. See also George v. LDS Hosp., 797 P.2d 1117 
(Utah App. 1990)(in wrongful death action, trial 
court improperly took proximate cause from jury on 
grounds that nurses' failure to notify doctors of 
patient's worsening condition was not proximate 
cause because of subsequent intervening negligence). 
3. Smith's experts also agreed that these techniques-
-deterrence and refraining from using force or 
chasing the shoplifter-are valid security methods. 
Their testimony, however, asserted that Smith's 
employees had been adequately trained in these 
procedures and properly followed the procedures 
during the Burnett shoplifting incident. 
4. Smith's employee manuals contain statements 
advocating the use of deterrence techniques in han-
dling shoplifters: 
Make sure that employees on the sales 
floor are greeting and making eye 
contact with customers, especially those 
who are acting suspiciously. Make use 
of the intercom system by calling for 
security from time to time. Very effec-
tive tool, it gives the potential shoplifter 
an uneasy feeling that security is in the r 
store. 
Similarly, the company manuals also instruct its 
employees regarding the importance of customer 
safety in handling shoplifters: 
Our company policy is that no employee 
is to take any action in the apprehension 
of a shoplifter which will bring harm to 
himself, to other employees, or to cust-
omers. The most important thing to 
remember about apprehending a shopl-
ifter is that we do not want anyone 
injured. There is nothing in the store 
that is worth a person getting hurt for. 
Use common sense, if the situation 
can't be properly controlled let the 
shoplifter go and attempt to get a license 
number. 
5. We recognize the trial judge's decision finding 
Smith owed Mrs Steffensen a duty to take reason-
able precautions to protect her from the criminal 
acts of third parties was correct. Since trial, the 
Utah Supreme Court has visited the issue of a shop-
owner's duty to protect customers from the criminal 
acts of third parties. See Dwiggins v. Morgan Jew-
elers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah 1991). In Dwiggins, the 
Utah Supreme Court adopted section 344 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, stating landowners 
have a duty to business invitees to take reasonable 
steps to protect invitees from the criminal acts of 
third parties where such acts are reasonably forese-
eable. The Dwiggins court held where a jewelry 
store had been robbed only once in ten years, a 
robbery is not foreseeable. However, Dwiggins is 
distinguishable because the store in question was the 
most frequently shoplifted store in the Smith's 
chain. Further, the fact that Smith's employee 
manuals advocate the safe handling of shoplifters 
demonstrates Smith did, in fact, foresee such crim-
inal acts. Therefore, we believe the trial judge pro-
perly found that because customer injury from 
shoplifters was foreseeable, the law imposed a duty 
on Smith to take reasonable measures to protect its 
customers from injuries resulting from dealing with 
shoplifters. See also Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 
P.2d 43, 46-49 (Colo. 1987)(store owner had a 
duty to take reasonable security measures to protect 
customers where store had been subject of armed 
robbery ten times in past three years)(relied on by 
Dwiggins, 811 P.2d at 183 n.l). 
6. Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact." Utah R. Evid. 704 (1991). 
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